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Philosophy for AS

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Acknowledgements xxii
Introduction 1 (5)
An invitation to philosophy 1 (1)
How to use this book 2 (1)
Following the syllabus 2 (1)
Glossary 2 (1)
Marginal features 2 (1)
Companion website and further resources 3 (1)
The examination 3 (1)
Assessment objectives 3 (1)
The structure of the exams 4 (1)
The marks 4 (1)
Acknowledgements 5 (1)
Unit 1 An Introduction to Philosophy 1 6 (193)
Reason and experience 6 (41)
Introduction 7 (17)
Introductory ideas 7 (1)
Knowledge and belief 7 (1)
Two important contrasts 8 (2)
Defining rationalism and empiricism 10 (1)
Do all ideas derive from sense 11 (1)
experience?
Locke on `tabula rasa' 11 (1)
A different definition of `innate idea' 12 (1)
Empiricists on acquiring concepts 13 (1)
Simple and complex concepts 14 (1)
Are there innate concepts? 15 (2)
Are all claims about what exists 17 (1)
ultimately grounded in and justified by
sense experience?
Hume's `fork' 17 (1)
Induction and deduction 18 (1)
Using a priori intuition and 19 (2)
demonstration to establish claims of
what exists
Conceptual schemes and their 21 (1)
philosophical implications
An implication: conceptual relativism 22 (2)
Development 24 (22)
Do all ideas derive from sense 24 (1)
experience? II
The empiricist theory assessed 24 (3)
Innate ideas assessed 27 (2)
Are all claims about what exists 29 (1)
ultimately grounded in and justified by
sense experience? II
Innate knowledge 29 (2)
Knowledge through a priori intuition 31 (3)
and demonstration
Ayer's verification principle 34 (1)
Mathematical knowledge 35 (2)
Is certainty confined to introspection 37 (1)
and the tautological?
What is certainty? 38 (1)
Certainty, introspection and tautology 39 (1)
Conceptual schemes and their 40 (1)
philosophical implications II
Kant on the structure of experience 41 (2)
Going further: comparing the two ideas 43 (1)
of conceptual schemes
Implications 43 (1)
Going further: the conditions of the 44 (2)
possibility of experience
Summary 46 (1)
Why should I be governed? 47 (40)
Introduction 48 (20)
The state of nature 48 (1)
Hobbes: the state of nature as a state 49 (1)
of war
The causes of war 50 (1)
Locke on the state of nature 51 (1)
The benefits of political organisation 52 (1)
Political obligation and consent 53 (1)
Consent as the basis of obligation 53 (1)
Explicit consent 54 (1)
The concepts of power, authority and 55 (1)
legitimacy
Power 55 (1)
Authority 56 (1)
Legitimacy 57 (1)
Whether legitimacy requires popular 57 (1)
approval
Plato's objection 58 (1)
Disobedience and dissent 59 (1)
Obligation and the right of dissent 59 (1)
The implications of dissent for 60 (1)
political obligation
Just grounds for dissent 61 (1)
Civil disobedience and direct action 62 (1)
Defining civil disobedience 63 (2)
A continuum of cases 65 (1)
Justifying civil disobedience 66 (2)
Development 68 (17)
The state of nature 68 (1)
Hobbes on the Laws of Nature 69 (1)
The benefits of political organisation 70 (1)
II
Locke on punishment 70 (1)
Is it rational to submit to authority? 71 (1)
Going further: an absolute sovereign? 71 (1)
Two reasons to submit to authority 72 (3)
Political obligation and consent 75 (1)
Tacit consent 75 (1)
Voting and tacit consent 75 (1)
Hypothetical consent 76 (1)
Legitimacy and popular approval 76 (1)
Going further: what is `legitimate 76 (1)
authority'?
The question of popular approval 77 (2)
Disobedience and dissent 79 (1)
Dissent and obligation 79 (1)
Just grounds for dissent: assessing 80 (1)
Locke
Justifying civil disobedience II 81 (1)
Going further: a right to civil 81 (1)
disobedience?
Consequences 82 (1)
Motivation 82 (1)
Justifying direct action 83 (2)
Summary 85 (2)
Why should I be moral? 87 (37)
Introduction 88 (14)
`It is reasonable to conform to the 88 (1)
expectations of morality'
Morality 89 (1)
Morality as a social contract 89 (1)
Morality is a conventional agreement 89 (1)
for our mutual advantage
Self-interest and rational egoism 90 (1)
Morality as an agreement 91 (1)
Can we articulate our self-interest 92 (1)
independently of morality?
Morality as constitutive of 93 (1)
self-interest
Self-interest can only be realised in 93 (1)
the context of a moral life
Plato's argument: the moral soul 93 (2)
Are self-interested reasons compatible 95 (2)
with an understanding of morality?
Morality as overcoming self-interest 97 (1)
Disregarding self-interest 97 (1)
Kant: morality is based on reason 97 (2)
Motivating reasons and morality 99 (1)
Is moral motivation a reflection of 100 (1)
natural dispositions?
Hume on sympathy 100 (2)
Development 102 (20)
Morality as a social contract 102 (1)
Morality is a conventional agreement 102 (1)
for our mutual advantage II
The Prisoner's Dilemma 102 (1)
The `free rider' problem 103 (1)
Exactly what kind of agreement could it 104 (1)
be?
A tacit agreement 104 (1)
A hypothetical agreement 104 (2)
Two objections 106 (1)
Can we articulate our self-interest 107 (1)
independently of morality?
Rationality and self-interest 107 (2)
Morality as constitutive of 109 (1)
self-interest
Self-interest can only be realised in 109 (1)
the context of a moral life II
Aristotle on living in accordance with 109 (1)
reason
Going further: are we all social? 110 (1)
Self-interest and morality 111 (1)
Going further: Nietzsche on moral 112 (2)
motivation
Morality as overcoming self-interest 114 (1)
On what is reasonable 114 (1)
What reason recommends 114 (1)
Alternative accounts of reason 115 (1)
Reason, motivation and self-interest 115 (1)
Going further: reason before desire? 115 (2)
Psychological egoism 117 (1)
Moral motivation as a reflection of 118 (1)
natural dispositions: implications for
ethics
Sympathy and self-interest 119 (1)
Sympathy as the foundation of morality 119 (1)
Sympathy and argument 120 (1)
Does all morality stem from sympathy? 120 (2)
Summary 122 (2)
The idea of God 124 (36)
Introduction 125 (11)
The divine attributes 125 (1)
God as personal 126 (1)
Omnipotence 126
Omniscience 117 (10)
Perfect goodness 127 (1)
Transcendence and immanence 128 (1)
Existence without beginning or end 128 (1)
The ontological argument 129 (1)
St Anselm's version of the ontological 129 (1)
argument
Objections 130 (2)
The origins of `God' 132 (1)
The idea of God is innate 132 (1)
The idea of God is derived from 133 (1)
experience
Explaining the idea of `God' as a human 134 (1)
construction and projection
Invention as explanation 134 (1)
Invention and projection 135 (1)
Development 136 (22)
The divine attributes 136 (1)
Are the divine attributes singularly or 137 (1)
mutually coherent?
Omniscience 137 (1)
Going further: omniscience, 138 (1)
transcendence and perfect goodness
Omnipotence 139 (1)
Omnipotence and perfect goodness 140 (4)
Transcendence, immanence and the 144 (1)
personal
The ontological argument 145 (1)
Descartes and perfection 145 (2)
Objections to Descartes 147 (1)
Going further: necessary existence 148 (1)
The origins of `God' 149 (1)
The idea of God is innate II 149 (1)
Objection 150 (1)
Explaining the idea of `God' as a human 151 (1)
construction and projection II
God of the gaps 151 (2)
Freud: a psychological explanation 153 (1)
Social explanations 154 (2)
Going further: Nietzsche 156 (2)
Summary 158 (2)
Persons 160 (39)
Introduction 161 (18)
What are the characteristics of 161 (1)
personhood?
The characteristics associated with 161 (1)
personhood
One who is embodied, one to whom we 162 (1)
ascribe mental and physical
characteristics
Possessing a network of beliefs 163 (1)
Rationality 163 (1)
A social being, one whose sense of self 164 (1)
emerges in and is created through
relationships with others
Self-awareness and awareness of oneself 164 (1)
as a continuing subject of experience
A language user, able to communicate 165 (1)
meanings
Being reflective about one's 166 (1)
experiences, feelings and motives as
well as those of others
Creativity, autonomy and/or 167 (1)
individuality, one who shapes
themselves through choices, goals,
actions and reactions
One who is responsible, accountable and 167 (1)
possesses rights in virtue of this
What is a person? 168 (1)
Are all humans persons? 168 (1)
Non-human animals, machines and the 169 (1)
characteristics of personhood
Non-human animals 169 (3)
Machines: computers 172 (2)
What secures our personal identity 174 (1)
through time?
Physical and psychological continuity 174 (1)
A first distinction 174 (1)
Necessary and sufficient conditions 174 (1)
Psychological theories of personal 175 (1)
identity
Is psychological continuity sufficient 176 (1)
for personal identity?
Physical continuity theories of 177 (2)
personal identity
Development 179 (18)
What are the characteristics of 179 (1)
personhood?
The concept of a person as a natural 179 (1)
phenomenon and as primitive
Going further: the concept of a person 180 (1)
as primitive
The concept of a person as natural 181 (1)
A matter of degree? 181 (2)
What is a person? 183 (1)
Are all humans persons? II 183 (1)
Souls 183 (1)
`Individuals' 183 (1)
Extending the term `person' 184 (1)
Are some non-humans persons? 184 (1)
Souls again 185 (1)
Are non-human animals or machines 185 (1)
persons?
First-person perspective 186 (1)
Animals, machines and first-person 186 (1)
perspective
What secures our personal identity 187 (1)
through time?
Physical and psychological continuity II 187 (1)
Persons are souls 188 (1)
Is psychological continuity necessary 189 (2)
or sufficient for personal identity?
Physical and psychological continuity 191 (2)
together are necessary and sufficient
Is our survival, rather than identity 193 (1)
through time, more important?
The implications of cloning, brain 194 (1)
damage, body alterations etc.
Cloning 194 (1)
Brain damage 195 (1)
Body alterations 195 (1)
Etc. 196 (1)
Summary 197 (2)
Unit 2 An Introduction to Philosophy 2 199 (203)
Knowledge of the external world 199 (36)
Introduction 200 (15)
Realism 201 (1)
What do we perceive? Direct and 201 (1)
representative realism
Do physical objects have the properties 202 (1)
we perceive them to have?
Is direct realism naive? 202 (1)
Distance and size 202 (1)
Illusions 203 (1)
The secondary quality thesis 204 (1)
Representative realism 205 (1)
Sense-data and physical objects 206 (1)
From illusion to a theory of perception 207 (1)
Could we know of a relation between 207 (2)
sense-data and physical objects?
Idealism 209 (1)
Are physical objects collections of 209 (2)
ideas?
Two good reasons for idealism 211 (1)
The linking problem 211 (1)
Empiricism 211 (1)
Difficulties with idealism 212 (1)
Is realism a simpler alternative to 212 (1)
idealism?
Unperceived objects 213 (2)
Development 215 (18)
Situating the question 215 (1)
Realism 215 (1)
Is direct realism naive? II 215 (1)
Going further: the content of sense 216 (1)
experience
Illusions 217 (1)
Going further: what exists in a 218 (1)
hallucination?
The secondary quality thesis II 219 (1)
A further objection: perceptual 220 (1)
variation
Going further: do sceptical arguments 221 (1)
cast doubt on direct realism?
Representative realism 222 (1)
Do sceptical arguments establish 222 (1)
sense-data?
Perceptual variation 222 (1)
Secondary qualities: the argument from 223 (1)
science
Time lag 224 (1)
Going further: sense-data are impossible 225 (1)
Could we know of a relation between 226 (2)
sense-data and physical objects? II
Idealism 228 (1)
A third good reason for idealism: 228 (1)
substance
Going further: do minds exist? 229 (1)
Difficulties with idealism II 229 (1)
Illusions 229 (1)
Going further: simplicity again 230 (1)
A confusion about `ideas' 231 (2)
Summary 233 (2)
Tolerance 235 (38)
Introduction 236 (15)
What is tolerance? 236 (1)
Weak and strong senses of `tolerance' 236 (1)
Opposition 237 (1)
The value of tolerance 238 (1)
Two final points 238 (1)
The tolerant society 239 (1)
Tolerance and the ideal of a liberal 239 (1)
democracy
Liberal democracy 239 (2)
The place of tolerance 241 (1)
Tolerance as the virtue of a pluralist 241 (1)
democracy
Arguments for tolerance 242 (1)
The threat posed by strife 242 (1)
Fallibility 242 (2)
The value of autonomy 244 (2)
The tolerant individual 246 (1)
What characteristics do tolerant 246 (1)
individuals possess?
Responsible judgement 246 (1)
Reasonableness 246 (1)
Tolerance as a virtue 247 (1)
Comparing accounts 247 (1)
Tensions and applications 248 (1)
Liberalism and the limits of tolerance 248 (1)
Tolerating the intolerant 248 (2)
The impossibility of tolerance? 250 (1)
Development 251 (20)
The tolerant society 251 (1)
Arguments for tolerance II 251 (1)
Variations on fallibilism 251 (1)
That coercion is ineffective 252 (1)
The value of diversity 253 (2)
Tolerance and neutrality 255 (1)
The tolerant society need not be neutral 255 (1)
Neutrality is inconsistent with the 256 (1)
values of tolerance
Going further: neutrality is not neutral 257 (1)
Whether a culture which encourages 257 (1)
tolerance should be nurtured
Devlin's argument 258 (1)
Going further: civility and respect 259 (2)
The tolerant individual 261 (1)
What characteristics do tolerant 261 (1)
individuals possess? II
Going further: strong and weak 261 (1)
tolerance again
Individual rationality and autonomy, 262 (2)
and cultural membership
Tolerance, leaving others alone, and 264 (1)
offence
Tensions and applications 265 (1)
Tolerance and a liberal culture 265 (1)
Tolerance, critical faculties and false 266 (1)
needs
New ideas and critical faculties 266 (1)
False needs and repressive desublimation 267 (2)
Tolerance and religion 269 (1)
Tolerance and social difference 270 (1)
Summary 271 (2)
The value of art 273 (40)
Introduction 274 (18)
Introductory remarks 274 (1)
What is art v. the value of art 274 (1)
Valuing art 275 (1)
Engaging with the argument 275 (1)
We value art because it informs us 276 (1)
Good art should portray authentically 276 (1)
The value of representation 276 (1)
How is art supposed to stand for 277 (2)
reality?
Are all arts equally concerned with 279 (1)
representing?
Even if art informs us, is that why we 280 (1)
value it as art?
We value art because of its particular 281 (1)
`artistic' quality
Good art affords an aesthetic enjoyment 281 (1)
of `form'
Aesthetic enjoyment 281 (2)
Form 283 (1)
Criticisms of formalism 284 (1)
Is the notion of `form' clear? 284 (1)
Are there recognisable formal universal 285 (1)
displayed in art?
Even if `form' matters, is it the 285 (1)
`essence' of art qua art?
We value art because of its expressive 286 (1)
quality
Good art is moving or captures a mood 286 (1)
or feeling
Emotion in art 286 (2)
Discussion and development 288 (1)
Collingwood 289 (1)
Objections to Collingwood 290 (2)
Development 292 (20)
We value art because it informs us 292 (1)
Good art should illuminate our 292 (1)
experience or reveal `truths'
The artist's vision 292 (1)
Going further: what could we mean by 293 (1)
`truth' in art?
Even if art informs us, is that why we 294 (1)
value it as art? II
We value art because of its particular 295 (1)
`artistic' quality
Good art affords an aesthetic enjoyment 295 (1)
of `form' II
Kant on `free play' 295 (2)
Going further: Bell on significant form 297 (1)
Criticisms of formalism II 298 (1)
Even if `form' matters, is it the 298 (1)
`essence' of art qua art? II
Does formalism neglect the place art 299 (1)
has in life?
We value art because of its expressive 300 (1)
quality
Good art is moving or captures a mood 300 (1)
or feeling II
Croce: the expressive function of art 300 (1)
Objections 301 (2)
How can psychological ascriptions apply 303 (1)
to works of art?
Expression as metaphor 304 (1)
Going further: expression, effect and 305 (1)
intention
Aesthetic emotion? 306 (1)
Do we value the artists' 307 (1)
self-expression or our responses?
`The intentional fallacy' 307 (2)
Going further: the artist's mind in the 309 (3)
artwork
Summary 312 (1)
God and the world 313 (37)
Introduction 314 (17)
The argument from design 314 (1)
Arguments for design 314 (1)
Life 315 (1)
The `fine tuning' argument 316 (1)
Arguments from design 317 (1)
The argument from analogy 317 (3)
The problem of evil 320 (1)
The argument 320 (1)
The logical problem 320 (1)
The evidential problem 321 (1)
Moral and natural evil 321 (1)
The free will defence 322 (1)
Augustine's argument 322 (1)
Soul-making 323 (1)
Objections 323 (1)
The religious point of view 324 (1)
Different perspectives (`seeing-as') 324 (1)
Perceptual experiencing-as 325 (1)
Religious experience 326 (1)
The status of the religious `hypothesis' 327 (1)
Religious `belief' mirrors attitudes 328 (1)
rather than facts
Objections 329 (2)
Development 331 (18)
The argument from design 331 (1)
Arguments for design II 331 (1)
Paley and design-like properties 331 (1)
Going further: `intelligent design' 332 (1)
Arguments from design II 333 (1)
Swinburne's argument 333 (1)
Going further: best explanation 334 (1)
The limits of explanation 335 (2)
The problem of evil 337 (1)
Going further: how good is free will? 337 (1)
Soul-making II 338 (1)
The best of all possible worlds 339 (1)
The laws of nature 339 (1)
The standard for `best possible world' 340 (1)
Going further: the argument and the 341 (1)
appeal to ignorance
The afterlife 342 (2)
The religious point of view 344 (1)
Different perspectives (`seeing-as') II 344 (1)
Religious `belief', hypothesis and 345 (1)
attitudes
Going further: Wittgenstein on language 345 (1)
Religious belief 346 (3)
Summary 349 (1)
Free will and determinism 350 (40)
Introduction 351 (16)
What is determinism? 351 (1)
Determinism defined 351 (1)
Universal causation 352 (1)
Causal necessity 352 (1)
Determinism and human action 353 (1)
Action and causation 353 (1)
An important contrast 354 (1)
Human action as subject to natural laws 354 (1)
Physical laws 355 (1)
Psychological laws 355 (1)
Determinism distinguished from 356 (1)
predictability
What is free will? 357 (1)
Free will as requiring indeterminism 357 (1)
Hard determinism and libertarianism 357 (1)
Objections 358 (1)
Compatibilism I: voluntary action as 359 (1)
defined in terms of the type of cause
from which it issues
Compatibilism II: voluntary action as 360 (1)
causally determined and yet
distinguishable from psychologically or
physically constrained action
Objections 361 (2)
The implications of determinism 363 (1)
Determinism as undermining moral 363 (1)
responsibility
The implications of the view that 363 (1)
`ought' implies `can'
The extent to which praise, blame and 364 (1)
punishment can be meaningfully employed
if determinism is true
Ought implies can 364 (1)
Ought does not imply can 364 (1)
Determinism as undermining rationality 365 (2)
Development 367 (21)
What is determinism? 367 (1)
Determinism developed 367 (1)
The state of the universe 367 (1)
Causal chain 367 (1)
Chance as compatible with determinism 368 (1)
Chaos theory 368 (1)
Going further: quantum mechanics 369 (1)
Determinism distinguished from fatalism 370 (1)
and predestination
Fatalism 370 (1)
Predestination 371 (1)
All human action as the inevitable 371 (1)
result of environmental and hereditary
factors
Strong determinism 372 (1)
Weak determinism 373 (1)
Going further: limitation is not 373 (1)
determinism
The experience of free will as an 374 (2)
illusion
What is free will? 376 (1)
Human decision making as occupying a 376 (1)
special place outside of the natural
order
Free will requires a gap in universal 377 (1)
causality
Free will and quantum theory 377 (1)
Going further: Nietzsche on free will 378 (1)
Free will as compatible with determinism 378 (1)
Frankfurt: second-order desires 378 (2)
Regularity and necessity 380 (1)
Going further: `other things being 381 (1)
equal'
The implications of determinism 382 (1)
The extent to which praise, blame and 382 (1)
punishment can be meaningfully employed
if determinism is true II
Strawson: `reactive attitudes' 382 (2)
Moral responsibility and persons 384 (1)
Going further: moral responsibility 385 (1)
without being able to do otherwise
The distinction between reasons and 386 (1)
causes
The distinction between action and 386 (1)
bodily movement
The argument for compatibilism 387 (1)
Summary 388 (2)
Preparing for the exam 390 (12)
Revision: knowing what the examiners 390 (5)
are looking for
Understanding the question: giving the 395 (1)
examiners what they want
Key words 395 (1)
Question structure and marks 395 (1)
Exam technique: getting the best result 396 (4)
you can
Revision tips 400 (1)
Exam tips 400 (2)
Glossary 402 (3)
Index by syllabus content 405 (10)
Index 415

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